K-实施
K-Implementation
摘要：
本文讨论了一个利益相关方谁希望在一个游戏（多智能体交互），这是不受他的控制影响的行为的代理。利益相关方不能设计新的博弈，不能强制代理人的行为，不能强制代理人付款，也不能禁止代理人使用策略。然而，他可以通过对代理人可能选择的不同策略配置文件承诺非负的货币转移来影响游戏的结果。利益相关方假设代理人是理性的，在通常公认的意义上，他们不使用劣势策略。因此，如果通过增加非负支付，理性参与者必然会在这个子集中产生结果，那么在给定的博弈中会实现某个子集的结果。显然，通过支付足够大的款项，人们可以实现任何理想的结果。问题是实施的成本是多少？在本文中，我们介绍的概念，k-实现所需的一组策略配置文件，其中k代表的金额，实际上需要进行，以实现理想的结果。k-实施的一个要点是，在遵循期望的行为时，货币优惠不一定要实现。我们定义和研究的背景下，完全和不完全信息的游戏中的k-实现。在后一种情况下，我们主要关注VCG游戏。我们的设置后来扩展到处理混合策略使用相关设备。总之，本文介绍和研究的理想结果的实施可靠的一方谁不能修改游戏规则（即提供协议），补充以前的工作在机制设计，同时使其更适用于许多现实的CS设置。
英文摘要：
This paper discusses an interested party who wishes to influence the behavior of agents in a game (multi-agent interaction), which is not under his control. The interested party cannot design a new game, cannot enforce agents' behavior, cannot enforce payments by the agents, and cannot prohibit strategies available to the agents. However, he can influence the outcome of the game by committing to non-negative monetary transfers for the different strategy profiles that may be selected by the agents. The interested party assumes that agents are rational in the commonly agreed sense that they do not use dominated strategies. Hence, a certain subset of outcomes is implemented in a given game if by adding non-negative payments, rational players will necessarily produce an outcome in this subset. Obviously, by making sufficiently big payments one can implement any desirable outcome. The question is what is the cost of implementation? In this paper we introduce the notion of k-implementation of a desired set of strategy profiles, where k stands for the amount of payment that need to be actually made in order to implement desirable outcomes. A major point in k-implementation is that monetary offers need not necessarily materialize when following desired behaviors. We define and study k-implementation in the contexts of games with complete and incomplete information. In the latter case we mainly focus on the VCG games. Our setting is later extended to deal with mixed strategies using correlation devices. Together, the paper introduces and studies the implementation of desirable outcomes by a reliable party who cannot modify game rules (i.e. provide protocols), complementing previous work in mechanism design, while making it more applicable to many realistic CS settings.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
