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arXiv 1106.6058nlin.AOnlin.CD
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网络上支付驱动进化博弈策略的稳定性

Stability of strategies in payoff-driven evolutionary games on networks

Francesco Sorrentino, Nicholas Mecholsky

摘要:

我们考虑一个网络的耦合代理玩囚徒困境的游戏,其中玩家被允许选择一个策略在区间[0,1],0对应于背叛,1合作,和中间值代表混合策略,其中每个玩家可以作为合作者或背叛者在大量的互动与一定的概率。我们的模型是收益驱动的,即,我们假设每个节点的累积收益水平是策略选择中的一个相关参数。此外,我们认为,每个球员选择他/她的策略在有限的信息。我们提出了一个确定性的非线性模型的战略演变。我们表明,最终的战略取决于网络结构和游戏的参数的选择。我们发现,极化策略(纯合作者/叛逃者状态)通常出现在(i)网络连接稀疏,(ii)网络度分布是异质的,(iii)网络是独立的,令人惊讶的是,(iv)合作的好处是高的。

英文摘要:

We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing mixed strategies in which each player may act as a cooperator or a defector over a large number of interactions with a certain probability. Our model is payoff-driven, i.e., we assume that the level of accumulated payoff at each node is a relevant parameter in the selection of strategies. Also, we consider that each player chooses his/her strategy in a context of limited information. We present a deterministic nonlinear model for the evolution of strategies. We show that the final strategies depend on the network structure and on the choice of the parameters of the game. We find that polarized strategies (pure cooperator/defector states) typically emerge when (i) the network connections are sparse, (ii) the network degree distribution is heterogeneous, (iii) the network is assortative, and surprisingly, (iv) the benefit of cooperation is high.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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