雇用团队的防假名机制
False-name-proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
摘要:
我们研究的问题,雇用一队自私的代理人来执行一项任务。假设每个代理人拥有一个或多个集合系统的元素,拍卖人试图通过拍卖购买一个可行的解决方案。我们的目标是设计真实和虚假名称证明的拍卖,这意味着它是在代理人的最佳利益,揭示所有元素的所有权(可能不知道拍卖师先验),以及他们的真实成本。我们首先提出并分析了一个假名证明机制的特殊情况下,每个代理人在现实中只拥有一个元素,但可能会假装这个元素实际上是一组多个元素。我们证明了它的节俭率是有界的$2^n$,其中,常数,匹配的下限$Ω(2^n)$在这种情况下,所有的假名证明机制。然后,我们提出了第二种机制的一般情况下,代理人可能拥有多个元素。它要求拍卖人事先选择一个保留成本,因此并不总是购买一个解决方案。作为回报,即使代理拥有多个元素,它也是防假名的。我们通过模拟实验评估第二种机制的支付(以及社会盈余)。
英文摘要:
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is to design auctions that are truthful and false-name-proof, meaning that it is in the agents' best interest to reveal ownership of all elements (which may not be known to the auctioneer a priori) as well as their true incurred costs. We first propose and analyze a false-name-proof mechanism for the special case where each agent owns only one element in reality, but may pretend that this element is in fact a set of multiple elements. We prove that its frugality ratio is bounded by $2^n$, which, up to constants, matches a lower bound of $Ω(2^n)$ for all false-name-proof mechanisms in this scenario. We then propose a second mechanism for the general case in which agents may own multiple elements. It requires the auctioneer to choose a reserve cost a priori, and thus does not always purchase a solution. In return, it is false-name-proof even when agents own multiple elements. We experimentally evaluate the payment (as well as social surplus) of the second mechanism through simulation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。