关于三个择一的Gibbard-Satterthwaite定理的一个定量形式
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem（希伯来大学）；Yale University（耶鲁大学）；Weizmann Institute of Science（魏茨曼科学研究所）
摘要：
Gibbard-Satterthwaite定理指出，至少三个选项中的每一个非独裁选举规则都可以被策略性地操纵。我们证明了定量版本的Gibbard-Satterthwaite定理：一个随机操纵由一个随机选民将成功的概率不可忽略的任何选举规则之间的三个选项，这是远远不是一个独裁政权，从只有两个选项在其范围内。
英文摘要：
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with a non-negligible probability for any election rule among three alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship and from having only two alternatives in its range.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
