Market makers continuously set bid and ask quotes for the stocks they have under consideration. Hence they face a complex optimization problem in which their return, based on the bid-ask spread they quote and the frequency at which they indeed provide liquidity, is challenged by the price risk they bear due to their inventory. In this paper, we consider a stochastic control problem similar to the one introduced by Ho and Stoll and formalized mathematically by Avellaneda and Stoikov. The market is modeled using a reference price $S_t$ following a Brownian motion with standard deviation $σ$, arrival rates of buy or sell liquidity-consuming orders depend on the distance to the reference price $S_t$ and a market maker maximizes the expected utility of its P&L over a finite time horizon. We show that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations associated to the stochastic optimal control problem can be transformed into a system of linear ordinary differential equations and we solve the market making problem under inventory constraints. We also shed light on the asymptotic behavior of the optimal quotes and propose closed-form approximations based on a spectral characterization of the optimal quotes.
In dealer markets, dealers provide prices at which they agree to buy and sell the assets and securities they have in their scope. With ever increasing trading volume, this quoting task has to be done algorithmically in most markets such as foreign exchange markets or corporate bond markets. Over the last ten years, many mathematical models have been designed that can be the basis of quoting algorithms in dealer markets. Nevertheless, in most (if not all) models, the dealer is a pure internalizer, setting quotes and waiting for clients. However, on many dealer markets, dealers also have access …
JPMorgan AI Research（摩根大通人工智能研究院）；JPMorgan Quantitative Research（摩根大通量化研究部）
Market makers play an important role in providing liquidity to markets by continuously quoting prices at which they are willing to buy and sell, and managing inventory risk. In this paper, we build a multi-agent simulation of a dealer market and demonstrate that it can be used to understand the behavior of a reinforcement learning (RL) based market maker agent. We use the simulator to train an RL-based market maker agent with different competitive scenarios, reward formulations and market price trends (drifts). We show that the reinforcement learning agent is able to learn about its competitor…
We introduce a method to infer lead-lag networks of agents' actions in complex systems. These networks open the way to both microscopic and macroscopic states prediction in such systems. We apply this method to trader-resolved data in the foreign exchange market. We show that these networks are remarkably persistent, which explains why and how order flow prediction is possible from trader-resolved data. In addition, if traders' actions depend on past prices, the evolution of the average price paid by traders may also be predictable. Using random forests, we verify that the predictability of bo…
The VSTOXX index tracks the expected 30-day volatility of the EURO STOXX 50 equity index. Futures on the VSTOXX index can, therefore, be used to hedge against economic uncertainty. We investigate the effect of trader inventory on the price of VSTOXX futures through a combination of stochastic processes and machine learning methods. We formulate a simple and efficient pricing methodology for VSTOXX futures, which assumes a Heston-type stochastic process for the underlying EURO STOXX 50 market. Under these dynamics, approximate analytical formulas for the implied volatility smile and the VSTOXX …
We provide an explicit characterization of the optimal market making strategy in a discrete-time Limit Order Book (LOB). In our model, the number of filled orders during each period depends linearly on the distance between the fundamental price and the market maker's limit order quotes, with random slope and intercept coefficients. The high-frequency market maker (HFM) incurs an end-of-the-day liquidation cost resulting from linear price impact. The optimal placement strategy incorporates in a novel and parsimonious way forecasts about future changes in the asset's fundamental price. We show t…
With the digitalization of the financial market, dealers are increasingly handling market-making activities by algorithms. Recent antitrust literature raises concerns on collusion caused by artificial intelligence. This paper studies the possibility of cooperation between market makers via independent Q-learning. Market making with inventory risk is formulated as a repeated general-sum game. Under a stag-hunt type payoff, we find that market makers can learn cooperative strategies without communication. In general, high spreads can have the largest probability even when the lowest spread is th…
University of Liverpool（利物浦大学）；Stratagem Technologies Ltd（斯特拉塔吉姆科技有限公司）；University College London（伦敦大学学院）
Market making is a fundamental trading problem in which an agent provides liquidity by continually offering to buy and sell a security. The problem is challenging due to inventory risk, the risk of accumulating an unfavourable position and ultimately losing money. In this paper, we develop a high-fidelity simulation of limit order book markets, and use it to design a market making agent using temporal-difference reinforcement learning. We use a linear combination of tile codings as a value function approximator, and design a custom reward function that controls inventory risk. We demonstrate t…
Market makers play an essential role in financial markets. A successful market maker should control inventory and adverse selection risks and provide liquidity to the market. As an important methodology in control problems, Reinforcement Learning enjoys the advantage of data-driven and less rigid assumptions, receiving great attention in the market-making field since 2018. However, although the China Commodity market has the biggest trading volume on agricultural products, nonferrous metals, and some other sectors, the study of applying RL to Market Making in China market is still rare. In thi…
This paper sets forth a framework for deep reinforcement learning as applied to market making (DRLMM) for cryptocurrencies. Two advanced policy gradient-based algorithms were selected as agents to interact with an environment that represents the observation space through limit order book data, and order flow arrival statistics. Within the experiment, a forward-feed neural network is used as the function approximator and two reward functions are compared. The performance of each combination of agent and reward function is evaluated by daily and average trade returns. Using this DRLMM framework,…
We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatility of the asset. We also provide the optimal quotes that should be displayed by the market maker. The simplicity of our formulas allows us to analyze in details the effects of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without contract. We show in par…
We model the behavior of three agent classes acting dynamically in a limit order book of a financial asset. Namely, we consider market makers (MM), high-frequency trading (HFT) firms, and institutional brokers (IB). Given a prior dynamic of the order book, similar to the one considered in the Queue-Reactive models [14, 20, 21], the MM and the HFT define their trading strategy by optimizing the expected utility of terminal wealth, while the IB has a prescheduled task to sell or buy many shares of the considered asset. We derive the variational partial differential equations that characterize th…
In most OTC markets, a small number of market makers provide liquidity to other market participants. More precisely, for a list of assets, they set prices at which they agree to buy and sell. Market makers face therefore an interesting optimization problem: they need to choose bid and ask prices for making money while mitigating the risk associated with holding inventory in a volatile market. Many market making models have been proposed in the academic literature, most of them dealing with single-asset market making whereas market makers are usually in charge of a long list of assets. The rare…
We study Nash equilibria for inventory-averse high-frequency traders (HFTs), who trade to exploit information about future price changes. For discrete trading rounds, the HFTs' optimal trading strategies and their equilibrium price impact are described by a system of nonlinear equations; explicit solutions obtain around the continuous-time limit. Unlike in the risk-neutral case, the optimal inventories become mean-reverting and vanish as the number of trading rounds becomes large. In contrast, the HFTs' risk-adjusted profits and the equilibrium price impact converge to their risk-neutral count…
University of Liverpool（利物浦大学）；L3S Research Center（L3S研究中心）；Leibniz University Hannover（汉诺威莱布尼茨大学）
This paper introduces a new representation for the actions of a market maker in an order-driven market. This representation uses scaled beta distributions, and generalises three approaches taken in the artificial intelligence for market making literature: single price-level selection, ladder strategies and "market making at the touch". Ladder strategies place uniform volume across an interval of contiguous prices. Scaled beta distribution based policies generalise these, allowing volume to be skewed across the price interval. We demonstrate that this flexibility is useful for inventory managem…
Most sales applications are characterized by competition and limited demand information. For successful pricing strategies, frequent price adjustments as well as anticipation of market dynamics are crucial. Both effects are challenging as competitive markets are complex and computations of optimized pricing adjustments can be time-consuming. We analyze stochastic dynamic pricing models under oligopoly competition for the sale of perishable goods. To circumvent the curse of dimensionality, we propose a heuristic approach to efficiently compute price adjustments. To demonstrate our strategy's ap…
The Invisible Handshake: Persistent Overpricing by Adaptive Market Agents
Department of Computer Science University of Milan（米兰大学计算机科学系）；Institute of Finance University of Lugano（卢加诺大学金融研究所）；LLUI；Department of Computer Science Vienna University of Technology（技术大学维也纳计算机科学系）
We study the optimal order placement strategy with the presence of a liquidity cost. In this problem, a stock trader wishes to clear her large inventory by a predetermined time horizon $T$. A trader uses both limit and market orders, and a large market order faces an adverse price movement caused by the liquidity risk. First, we study a single period model where the trader places a limit order and/or a market order at the beginning. We show the behavior of optimal amount of market order, $m^*$, and optimal placement of limit order, $y^*$, under different market conditions. Next, we extend it t…
In this paper we explore optimal liquidation in a market populated by a number of heterogeneous market makers that have limited inventory-carrying and risk-bearing capacity. We derive a reduced form model for the dynamic of their aggregated inventory considering a proper scaling limit. The resulting price impact profile is shown to depend on the characteristics and relative importance of their inventories. The model is flexible enough to reproduce the empirically documented power law behavior of the price impact function. For any choice of the market makers characteristics, optimal execution w…
Managing a book of options on several underlying involves controlling positions of several thousands of financial assets. It is one of the most challenging financial problems involving both pricing and microstructural modeling. An options market maker has to manage both long- and short-dated options having very different dynamics. In particular, short-dated options inventories cannot be managed as a part of an aggregated inventory, which prevents the use of dimensionality reduction techniques such as a factorial approach or first-order Greeks approximation. In this paper, we show that a simple…
We study a continuous-time version of the intermediation model of Grossman and Miller (1988). To wit, we solve for the competitive equilibrium prices at which liquidity takers' demands are absorbed by dealers with quadratic inventory costs, who can in turn gradually transfer these positions to an exogenous open market with finite liquidity. This endogenously leads to transient price impact in the dealer market. Smooth, diffusive, and discrete trades all incur finite but nontrivial liquidity costs, and can arise naturally from the liquidity takers' optimization.
In a semi-realistic market simulator, independent reinforcement learning algorithms may facilitate market makers to maintain wide spreads even without communication. This unexpected outcome challenges the current antitrust law framework. We study the effectiveness of maker-taker fee models in preventing cooperation via algorithms. After modeling market making as a repeated general-sum game, we experimentally show that the relation between net transaction costs and maker rebates is not necessarily monotone. Besides an upper bound on taker fees, we may also need a lower bound on maker rebates to…
Given the promising results on joint modeling of SPX/VIX smiles of the recently introduced quadratic rough Heston model, we consider a multi-asset market making problem on SPX and its derivatives, e.g. VIX futures, SPX and VIX options. The market maker tries to maximize its profit from spread capturing while controlling the portfolio's inventory risk, which can be fully explained by the value change of SPX under the particular setting of the quadratic rough Heston model. The high dimensionality of the resulting optimization problem is relaxed by several approximations. An asymptotic closed-for…
We develop a fundamentally different stochastic dynamic programming model of trading costs. Built on a strong theoretical foundation, our model provides insights to market participants by splitting the overall move of the security price during the duration of an order into the Market Impact (price move caused by their actions) and Market Timing (price move caused by everyone else) components. We derive formulations of this model under different laws of motion of the security prices, starting with a simple benchmark scenario and extending this to include multiple sources of uncertainty, liquidi…
High-frequency market making is a liquidity-providing trading strategy that simultaneously generates many bids and asks for a security at ultra-low latency while maintaining a relatively neutral position. The strategy makes a profit from the bid-ask spread for every buy and sell transaction, against the risk of adverse selection, uncertain execution and inventory risk. We design realistic simulations of limit order markets and develop a high-frequency market making strategy in which agents process order book information to post the optimal price, order type and execution time. By introducing t…
HSBC（汇丰银行）；Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Ceremade（巴黎第九大学-PSL，数学与决策研究中心）；Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, UFR 27 Mathématiques et Informatique, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne（巴黎第一大学潘提翁-索邦，信息与数学学院，索邦经济中心）
In corporate bond markets, which are mainly OTC markets, market makers play a central role by providing bid and ask prices for a large number of bonds to asset managers from all around the globe. Determining the optimal bid and ask quotes that a market maker should set for a given universe of bonds is a complex task. Useful models exist, most of them inspired by that of Avellaneda and Stoikov. These models describe the complex optimization problem faced by market makers: proposing bid and ask prices in an optimal way for making money out of the difference between bid and ask prices while mitig…
