最低出价拍卖中的理性、非理性和升级行为
Rationality, irrationality and escalating behavior in lowest unique bid auctions
摘要：
信息技术已经彻底改变了传统的市场结构。地理和时间限制的消除促进了网上拍卖市场的发展，目前全世界有数百万经济代理人，年交易额达数十亿美元。在这里，我们分析出价历史的一个小研究类型的在线拍卖-最低唯一出价拍卖。类似的觅食动物寻找稀缺的食物，我们发现，代理采用利维飞行搜索策略，在他们的探索“出价空间”。列维政权，其特点是由幂律衰减的步长概率分布，持有近三个数量级。我们开发了一个定量模型，最低的唯一出价网上拍卖，揭示了代理商使用近最优的投标策略。然而，参与这些拍卖的代理商并没有优化他们的财务收益。事实上，只要有许多拍卖参与者，一个理性的利润优化代理人将选择不参与这些拍卖市场。
英文摘要：
Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions --- lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Levy flight search strategies in their exploration of "bid space". The Levy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.
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