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arXiv 1103.0967cs.LOcs.ITmath.IT
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意向性与两步解释

Intensionality and Two-steps Interpretations

Zoran Majkic

摘要:

本文讨论了Bealer的内涵抽象算子对一阶逻辑的扩充。当代对“内涵”一词的使用源于传统逻辑学的弗雷格-罗素学说,即一个观念(逻辑公式)既有外延又有内涵。虽然在表述上存在分歧,但人们普遍认为,观念的外延由观念所适用的主体构成,而内涵则由观念所隐含的属性构成。从蒙塔古的观点来看,一个观念的意义可以被认为是在不同的可能世界中的特殊扩展。在纯FOL的情况下,我们得到交换同态图,保持在每个给定的可能世界的内涵FOL,从自由代数的FOL语法,对内涵代数的概念,并先后到新的外延关系代数(不同于代数)。然后,我们表明,它对应于塔斯基的解释标准的延伸FOL在这个可能的世界。

英文摘要:

In this paper we considered the extension of the First-order Logic (FOL) by Bealer's intensional abstraction operator. Contemporary use of the term 'intension' derives from the traditional logical Frege-Russell's doctrine that an idea (logic formula) has both an extension and an intension. Although there is divergence in formulation, it is accepted that the extension of an idea consists of the subjects to which the idea applies, and the intension consists of the attributes implied by the idea. From the Montague's point of view, the meaning of an idea can be considered as particular extensions in different possible worlds. In the case of the pure FOL we obtain commutative homomorphic diagram that holds in each given possible world of the intensional FOL, from the free algebra of the FOL syntax, toward its intensional algebra of concepts, and, successively, to the new extensional relational algebra (different from Cylindric algebras). Then we show that it corresponds to the Tarski's interpretation of the standard extensional FOL in this possible world.

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