少数人博弈中竞争主体间的合作
Cooperation amongst competing agents in minority games
摘要：
我们研究了少数者博弈的一种变体。有N个代理。每个人每天都要从两个选项中选择一个，并且小组中的每个成员都有奖励。智能体之间无法相互交流，只能根据过去选择两个选项的人数来猜测其他人的选择。我们描述了一个简单的概率策略，使用该策略，代理独立行事，仍然可以最大限度地提高每天受益的平均人数。该策略导致资源的非常有效的利用，并且对于任何$ε>0$，与最大可能的平均偏差可以由$(N^ε)$阶构成。我们还表明，一个单一的代理人不希望获得不遵循的战略。
英文摘要：
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to guess the choice others will make, based only the past history of number of people choosing the two alternatives. We describe a simple probabilistic strategy using which the agents acting independently, can still maximize the average number of people benefitting every day. The strategy leads to a very efficient utilization of resources, and the average deviation from the maximum possible can be made of order $(N^ε)$, for any $ε>0$. We also show that a single agent does not expect to gain by not following the strategy.
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