动态联盟TU博弈：局中人邻居间的分布式讨价还价
Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors
摘要：
我们考虑一个序列的可转移效用（TU）游戏，在每一个时间，特征函数是一个随机向量的实现限制到一些设置的值。该游戏不同于其他文献中的动态，随机或区间值TU游戏，因为它结合了动态的游戏与分配协议的球员，动态相互作用。该协议是一个迭代和分散的算法，提供了一个范例的谈判和讨价还价过程的数学描述。本文的第一部分有助于一个强大的（联盟）TU游戏的定义和分布式谈判协议的发展。我们证明了收敛概率为1的谈判过程中的一个随机分配，在一些温和的条件下，在底层通信图的鲁棒游戏的核心。本文的第二部分讨论了更一般的情况下，健壮的游戏可能有空的核心。在这种情况下，我们通过对特征函数序列进行时间平均，将动态平均博弈与动态博弈联系起来。然后，我们考虑一个相应修改的讨价还价协议。假设序列的特征函数是遍历和平均游戏的核心有一个非空的相对内部，我们证明了修改后的谈判协议收敛概率为1的随机分配，在于平均游戏的核心。
英文摘要：
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic, stochastic or interval valued TU games as it combines dynamics of the game with an allocation protocol for the players that dynamically interact with each other. The protocol is an iterative and decentralized algorithm that offers a paradigmatic mathematical description of negotiation and bargaining processes. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining process to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the underlying communication graphs. The second part of the paper addresses the more general case where the robust game may have empty core. In this case, with the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game by averaging over time the sequence of characteristic functions. Then, we consider an accordingly modified bargaining protocol. Assuming that the sequence of characteristic functions is ergodic and the core of the average game has a nonempty relative interior, we show that the modified bargaining protocol converges with probability 1 to a random allocation that lies in the core of the average game.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
