微生物博弈中利他策略的演化与稳定性
Evolution and stability of altruist strategies in microbial games
摘要：
当微生物争夺有限的资源时，它们经常使用细菌毒素进行化学战。这种竞争可以用演化博弈论（EGT）来理解。我们研究的预测EGT的细菌“自杀式炸弹袭击者”的游戏中的相位画像的种群动力学，参数组合，涵盖所有有趣的游戏，两个球员，和七个38个可能的相位画像的三人游戏。我们将这些预测与有限混合种群中这些竞争的模拟进行比较，但也允许概率而不是纯策略，以及达尔文适应数万代。我们发现，达尔文进化的概率策略稳定的石头剪刀布类型的游戏，出现的参数描述现实的细菌种群，并指出，在人口不动点可以通过改变这些参数选择的方式。
英文摘要：
When microbes compete for limited resources, they often engage in chemical warfare using bacterial toxins. This competition can be understood in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT). We study the predictions of EGT for the bacterial "suicide bomber" game in terms of the phase portraits of population dynamics, for parameter combinations that cover all interesting games for two-players, and seven of the 38 possible phase portraits of the three-player game. We compare these predictions to simulations of these competitions in finite well-mixed populations, but also allowing for probabilistic rather than pure strategies, as well as Darwinian adaptation over tens of thousands of generations. We find that Darwinian evolution of probabilistic strategies stabilizes games of the rock-paper-scissors type that emerge for parameters describing realistic bacterial populations, and point to ways in which the population fixed point can be selected by changing those parameters.
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