随机拓扑和合作的出现：捷径的作用
Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts
摘要：
我们详细研究了捷径的作用，在促进合作的出现在网络中的代理人玩囚徒困境游戏（PDG）。我们引入了一个模型，其拓扑结构通过改变一个参数的值（在两个尚未连接的节点之间添加链接的概率p）在一维欧氏格（环）和完全图之间插值。我们发现，有一个区域的p值在很大程度上提高了合作，而较小的p值只有少数合作者存在于最终状态，和p \rightarrow 1-合作是完全抑制。我们提出的分析参数，提供了一个非常合理的解释的模拟结果，从而揭示了捷径有助于促进（或抑制）合作的机制。
英文摘要：
We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between two nodes not already connected in the euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is largely enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p \rightarrow 1- cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promote (or suppress) cooperation.
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