缓存我，如果你能：网络中的能力限制自私复制游戏
Cache Me If You Can: Capacitated Selfish Replication Games in Networks
摘要：
在P2P网络系统中，节点之间的内容（对象）传递是经常需要的。研究这种分布式系统的一种方法是定义游戏，其中涉及自私的节点，这些节点在本地有限的内存（缓存）中复制内容或从其他节点访问内容以获取成本。这些自私复制游戏已经在[8]中引入，用于没有任何容量限制的节点，留下容量限制问题，即容量限制自私复制（CSR）游戏。在这项工作中，我们首先形成的CSR游戏模型，我们进行了纳什均衡分析。特别是，我们专注于分层网络，考虑到其广泛的使用模型的通信成本的内容交付在P2P系统。我们提出了一个精确的多项式时间算法的任何层次网络，在两个约束下的效用函数：1）“越近越好”，即最接近的内容是节点的访问成本越少，和2）“无关的替代品的独立性”，即个人节点偏好的聚合。这种推广代表了一个巨大的效用类别，更有趣的是，它允许每个节点同时具有完全不同的效用函数形式。在这个一般的框架中，我们提出了CSR游戏的结果在任意网络和轮廓之间的边界棘手和有效的可计算性的网络结构，对象的偏好，和对象的总数。此外，我们还证明了一般CSR对策的平衡点存在性问题是NP-困难的。
英文摘要：
In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network systems, content (object) delivery between nodes is often required. One way to study such a distributed system is by defining games, which involve selfish nodes that make strategic choices on replicating content in their local limited memory (cache) or accessing content from other nodes for a cost. These Selfish Replication games have been introduced in [8] for nodes that do not have any capacity limits, leaving the capacitated problem, i.e. Capacitated Selfish Replication (CSR) games, open. In this work, we first form the model of the CSR games, for which we perform a Nash equilibria analysis. In particular, we focus on hierarchical networks, given their extensive use to model communication costs of content delivery in P2P systems. We present an exact polynomial-time algorithm for any hierarchical network, under two constraints on the utility functions: 1) "Nearer is better", i.e. the closest the content is to the node the less its access cost is, and 2) "Independence of irrelevant alternatives", i.e. aggregation of individual node preferences. This generalization represents a vast class of utilities and more interestingly allows each of the nodes to have simultaneously completely different functional forms of utility functions. In this general framework, we present CSR games results on arbitrary networks and outline the boundary between intractability and effective computability in terms of the network structure, object preferences, and the total number of objects. Moreover, we prove that the problem of equilibria existence becomes NP-hard for general CSR games.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
