We study the following vertex-weighted online bipartite matching problem: $G(U, V, E)$ is a bipartite graph. The vertices in $U$ have weights and are known ahead of time, while the vertices in $V$ arrive online in an arbitrary order and have to be matched upon arrival. The goal is to maximize the sum of weights of the matched vertices in $U$. When all the weights are equal, this reduces to the classic \emph{online bipartite matching} problem for which Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani gave an optimal $\left(1-\frac{1}{e}\right)$-competitive algorithm in their seminal work~\cite{KVV90}. Our main result is an optimal $\left(1-\frac{1}{e}\right)$-competitive randomized algorithm for general vertex weights. We use \emph{random perturbations} of weights by appropriately chosen multiplicative factors. Our solution constitutes the first known generalization of the algorithm in~\cite{KVV90} in this model and provides new insights into the role of randomization in online allocation problems. It also effectively solves the problem of \emph{online budgeted allocations} \cite{MSVV05} in the case when an agent makes the same bid for any desired item, even if the bid is comparable to his budget - complementing the results of \cite{MSVV05, BJN07} which apply when the bids are much smaller than the budgets.
Two related online problems: knapsack and truthful bipartite matching are considered. For these two problems, the common theme is how to `match' an arriving left vertex in an online fashion with any of the available right vertices, if at all, so as to maximize the sum of the value of the matched edges, subject to satisfying a sum-weight constraint on the matched left vertices. Assuming that the left vertices arrive in an uniformly random order (secretary model), two almost similar algorithms are proposed for the two problems, that are $2e$ competitive and $24$ competitive, respectively. The pr…
We introduce a variant of the graph coloring problem, which we denote as {\sc Budgeted Coloring Problem} (\bcp). Given a graph $G$, an integer $c$ and an ordered list of integers $\{b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_c\}$, \bcp asks whether there exists a proper coloring of $G$ where the $i$-th color is used to color at most $b_i$ many vertices. This problem generalizes two well-studied graph coloring problems, {\sc Bounded Coloring Problem} (\bocp) and {\sc Equitable Coloring Problem} (\ecp) and as in the case of other coloring problems, it is \nph even for constant values of $c$. So we study \bcp under the…
We study the online budgeted allocation (also called ADWORDS) problem, where a set of impressions arriving online are allocated to a set of budget-constrained advertisers to maximize revenue. Motivated by connections to Internet advertising, several variants of this problem have been studied since the seminal work of Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani (FOCS 2005). However, this entire body of work focuses on a single budget for every advertising campaign, whereas in order to fully represent the actual agenda of an advertiser, an advertising budget should be expressible over multiple tiers o…
An online truthful budgeted matching problem is considered for a bipartite graph, where the right vertices are available ahead of time, and individual left vertices arrive sequentially. On arrival of a left vertex, its edge utilities (or weights) to all the right vertices and a corresponding cost (or bid) are revealed. If a left vertex is matched to any of the right vertices, then it has to be paid at least as much as its cost. The problem is to match each left vertex instantaneously and irrevocably to any one of the right vertices, if at all, to find the maximum weight matching that is truthf…
Ad auctions in sponsored search support ``broad match'' that allows an advertiser to target a large number of queries while bidding only on a limited number. While giving more expressiveness to advertisers, this feature makes it challenging to optimize bids to maximize their returns: choosing to bid on a query as a broad match because it provides high profit results in one bidding for related queries which may yield low or even negative profits. We abstract and study the complexity of the {\em bid optimization problem} which is to determine an advertiser's bids on a subset of keywords (possibl…
Given a graph $G$, a non-negative integer $k$, and a weight function that maps each vertex in $G$ to a positive real number, the \emph{Maximum Weighted Budgeted Independent Set (MWBIS) problem} is about finding a maximum weighted independent set in $G$ of cardinality at most $k$. A special case of MWBIS, when the weight assigned to each vertex is equal to its degree in $G$, is called the \emph{Maximum Independent Vertex Coverage (MIVC)} problem. In other words, the MIVC problem is about finding an independent set of cardinality at most $k$ with maximum coverage. Since it is a generalization of…
Recent work has addressed the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions so as to maximize revenue, most of which assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction. This does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice, in which bidders pay the next-highest bid for keywords that they are allocated. Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We show that the complex…
The Adwords and Online Bipartite Matching problems have enjoyed a renewed attention over the past decade due to their connection to Internet advertising. Our community has contributed, among other things, new models (notably stochastic) and extensions to the classical formulations to address the issues that arise from practical needs. In this paper, we propose a new generalization based on matroids and show that many of the previous results extend to this more general setting. Because of the rich structures and expressive power of matroids, our new setting is potentially of interest both in th…
Harvard John A. Paulson School Of Engineering And Applied Sciences（哈佛大学约翰·A·保罗森工程与应用科学学院）；Harvard University（哈佛大学）；Daniels School of Business（丹尼尔斯商学院）；Purdue University（普渡大学）；Institute of Computer Science（计算机科学研究所）；University of Wrocław（沃里克大学）；National University of Singapore（新加坡国立大学）；University of Chicago Booth School of Business（芝加哥大学博世商学院）；Yonsei University（延世大学）
We study the $b$-matching problem in bipartite graphs $G=(S,R,E)$. Each vertex $s\in S$ is a server with individual capacity $b_s$. The vertices $r\in R$ are requests that arrive online and must be assigned instantly to an eligible server. The goal is to maximize the size of the constructed matching. We assume that $G$ is a $(k,d)$-graph~\cite{NW}, where $k$ specifies a lower bound on the degree of each server and $d$ is an upper bound on the degree of each request. This setting models matching problems in timely applications. We present tight upper and lower bounds on the performance of deter…
Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction, which does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice. Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We show that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different than that of the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions…
Deterministic online matching under short augmenting paths and restricted vertex reassignments
Department of Mathematical Engineering, Universidad de Chile（智利大学数学工程系）；Center for Mathematical Modeling CNRS-IRL 2807, Universidad de Chile（智利大学数学建模中心）
In this work, we study a scenario where a publisher seeks to maximize its total revenue across two sales channels: guaranteed contracts that promise to deliver a certain number of impressions to the advertisers, and spot demands through an Ad Exchange. On the one hand, if a guaranteed contract is not fully delivered, it incurs a penalty for the publisher. On the other hand, the publisher might be able to sell an impression at a high price in the Ad Exchange. How does a publisher maximize its total revenue as a sum of the revenue from the Ad Exchange and the loss from the under-delivery penalty…
We consider a private variant of the classical allocation problem: given k goods and n agents with individual, private valuation functions over bundles of goods, how can we partition the goods amongst the agents to maximize social welfare? An important special case is when each agent desires at most one good, and specifies her (private) value for each good: in this case, the problem is exactly the maximum-weight matching problem in a bipartite graph. Private matching and allocation problems have not been considered in the differential privacy literature, and for good reason: they are plainly i…
