ESS用于面对欺骗突变体的合作消费者的生活史特征
ESS for life-history traits of cooperating consumers facing cheating mutants
摘要：
我们考虑一个由相同的个体组成的种群捕食一种可耗尽的资源。种群中的个体选择一种策略，该策略定义了它们在生命过程中如何利用可用时间进行喂养、繁殖（比如产卵）或在这两种活动之间分配能量。我们在这里假设它们的生命持续一个完整的季节，因此所选择的策略导致在整个季节中产生一定数量的蛋。这个数字有助于定义种群的长期进化，因为鸡蛋构成了下一个季节种群的基础。然而，在本文中，我们严格集中在一个赛季内发生的事情，通过考虑两种可能的策略：集体最佳和不可侵犯的战略。（集体）最优策略包含一个奇异弧，它具有一定的资源节约特征，并且从长期来看，可能导致均衡。然而，它很容易受到入侵的贪婪的突变免费乘坐这种资源节约战略。因此，“最优”策略不是进化稳定的。因此，我们使用第一个ESS条件（“纳什-沃德罗普条件”）来寻找进化稳定的策略。这产生了一个不同的奇异弧和一个节省资源较少的策略。不幸的是，我们在即将发表的论文中指出，虽然它是一个ESS，但它不是长期（跨季节）可持续的。这是经典的“公地悲剧”的一个例子。在本文中，我们还研究了是否可以解释的人口份额使用纯策略的奇异弧上的混合策略。答案是否定的。
英文摘要：
We consider a population of identical individuals preying on an exhaustible resource. The individuals in the population choose a strategy that defines how they use their available time over the course of their life for feeding, for reproducing (say laying eggs), or split their energy in between these two activities. We here suppose that their life lasts a full season, so that the chosen strategy results in the production of a certain number of eggs laid over the season. This number then helps define the long-run evolution of the population since the eggs constitute the basis for the population for the next season. However, in this paper, we strictly concentrate on what occurs within a season, by considering two possible strategies: the collective optimum and the uninvadable strategy. The (collective) optimal strategy involves a singular arc, which has some resource saving feature and may, on the long-term, lead to an equilibrium. However, it is susceptible to invasion by a greedy mutant which free-rides on this resource saving strategy. Therefore, the "optimal" strategy is not evolutionarily stable. We thus look for an evolutionarily stable strategy, using the first ESS condition ("Nash-Wardrop condition"). This yields a different singular arc and a strategy that conserves less the resource. Unfortunately, we show in a forthcoming paper that, though it is an ESS, it is not long-term (interseasonal) sustainable. This is an instance of the classical "tragedy of the commons". In this paper we also investigate whether the mixed strategy on the singular arcs may be interpreted in terms of population shares using pure strategies. The answer is negative.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
