论风险与不良品在多维筛选中的策略运用
On the strategic use of risk and undesirable goods in multidimensional screening
摘要:
垄断者出售的商品可能具有消费者不喜欢的特征(例如,他向风险厌恶代理人出售随机商品),这并不影响生产成本。我们调查了使用不受欢迎的商品是否对卖方有利的问题。我们证明,在一般情况下,这可能是这种情况下,根据代理类型和厌恶之间的相关性。这是由于筛选效应优于这种厌恶。我们分析,在一个连续的框架,一维和多维的情况下。
英文摘要:
A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells random goods to risk averse agents), which does not affect the production costs. We investigate the question whether using undesirable goods is profitable to the seller. We prove that in general this may be the case, depending on the correlation between agents types and aversion. This is due to screening effects that outperform this aversion. We analyze, in a continuous framework, both 1D and multidimensional cases.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。