Bucklin投票广泛抵制控制
Bucklin Voting is Broadly Resistant to Control
摘要：
选举控制模型通过添加/删除/划分候选人或选民等操作来改变选举结果。这些行动改变了选举的参与结构，目的是使最喜欢的候选人获胜（“建设性控制”）或防止被鄙视的候选人获胜（“破坏性控制”），这产生了总共22个标准控制场景。为了保护选举不受这种控制企图的影响，计算复杂性被用来表明选举控制虽然不是不可能的，但在计算上是禁止的。在具有多项式时间获胜者问题的自然投票系统中，对控制类型具有最高数量的已证明阻力的两个系统（即22个中的19个）是“基于真诚策略偏好的批准投票”（SP-AV，由Brams和Sanver提出的系统的修改）和回退投票。两者都是混合系统;例如，后备投票结合了批准和Bucklin投票。在本文中，我们研究的控制复杂性Bucklin投票本身，并表明，它的行为同样良好的控制阻力方面的20例调查到目前为止。由于Bucklin投票是回退投票的一种特殊情况，本文中对Bucklin投票的所有阻力都加强了回退投票的相应阻力。
英文摘要：
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. These actions modify an election's participation structure and aim at either making a favorite candidate win ("constructive control") or prevent a despised candidate from winning ("destructive control"), which yields a total of 22 standard control scenarios. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been used to show that electoral control, though not impossible, is computationally prohibitive. Among natural voting systems with a polynomial-time winner problem, the two systems with the highest number of proven resistances to control types (namely 19 out of 22) are "sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting" (SP-AV, a modification of a system proposed by Brams and Sanver) and fallback voting. Both are hybrid systems; e.g., fallback voting combines approval with Bucklin voting. In this paper, we study the control complexity of Bucklin voting itself and show that it behaves equally well in terms of control resistance for the 20 cases investigated so far. As Bucklin voting is a special case of fallback voting, all resistances shown for Bucklin voting in this paper strengthen the corresponding resistance for fallback voting.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
