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arXiv 1004.5548cs.CRcs.PL
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通过多样的双重编译对抗信任

Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling

David A. Wheeler

摘要:

空军对Multics的评估,以及Ken Thompson著名的图灵奖演讲“对信任的反思”,表明编译器可以被颠覆,将恶意特洛伊木马插入关键软件,包括它们自己。如果这种攻击未被检测到,即使对系统源代码进行完整的分析也无法找到正在运行的恶意代码,并且检测这种特定攻击的方法并不广为人知。本文介绍了一种实用的技术,称为多样的双重编译(DDC),检测这种攻击和一些编译器的缺陷。只需重新编译源代码两次:一次使用第二个(受信任的)编译器,再次使用第一次编译的结果。如果结果与不受信任的二进制文件逐位相同,则源代码准确地表示二进制文件。这一技术已被非正式地提及,但其问题和后果尚未在同行审查的工作中确定或讨论,也没有公开演示。本文描述了该技术,证明了它,描述了如何克服实际挑战,并演示了它。

英文摘要:

An Air Force evaluation of Multics, and Ken Thompson's famous Turing award lecture "Reflections on Trusting Trust," showed that compilers can be subverted to insert malicious Trojan horses into critical software, including themselves. If this attack goes undetected, even complete analysis of a system's source code will not find the malicious code that is running, and methods for detecting this particular attack are not widely known. This paper describes a practical technique, termed diverse double-compiling (DDC), that detects this attack and some compiler defects as well. Simply recompile the source code twice: once with a second (trusted) compiler, and again using the result of the first compilation. If the result is bit-for-bit identical with the untrusted binary, then the source code accurately represents the binary. This technique has been mentioned informally, but its issues and ramifications have not been identified or discussed in a peer-reviewed work, nor has a public demonstration been made. This paper describes the technique, justifies it, describes how to overcome practical challenges, and demonstrates it.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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