直觉主义与说谎者悖论
Intuitionism and the liar paradox
摘要：
直觉主义中考虑的非正式数学证明的概念显然容易受到说谎者悖论的影响。然而，对这一概念的仔细重新评估揭示了一个微妙的错误，其纠正阻止了矛盾。这导致了一个经典的语义悖论的一般决议。这篇论文是我早期论文“建构性真理与循环”[arXiv：0905.1681]的扩展版本。
英文摘要：
The concept of informal mathematical proof considered in intuitionism is apparently vulnerable to a version of the liar paradox. However, a careful reevaluation of this concept reveals a subtle error whose correction blocks the contradiction. This leads to a general resolution of the classical semantic paradoxes. This paper is an expanded version of parts of my earlier paper "Constructive truth and circularity" [arXiv:0905.1681].
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
