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arXiv 1002.4561cs.DC
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打破O(n^2)位障碍:使用自适应Adjuster的可扩展拜占庭协议

Breaking the O(n^2) Bit Barrier: Scalable Byzantine agreement with an Adaptive Adversary

Valerie King, Jared Saia

摘要:

我们描述了一个算法的拜占庭协议是可扩展的意义上说,每个处理器只发送$\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$位,其中$n$是处理器的总数。我们的算法成功的概率很高,对\emph{adaptive adversary},它可以接管处理器在任何时候在协议中,到接管任意接近1/3的分数。我们假设同步通信,但\emph{rushing}对手。此外,我们的算法在洪水的存在下工作:由对手控制的处理器可以发送任何数量的消息。我们假设所有对处理器之间存在私有通道,但没有其他密码学假设。最后,我们的算法在$n$中具有多对数的延迟。据我们所知,我们是第一个算法来解决拜占庭协议对自适应对手,同时需要$o(n^{2})$总位的通信。

英文摘要:

We describe an algorithm for Byzantine agreement that is scalable in the sense that each processor sends only $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$ bits, where $n$ is the total number of processors. Our algorithm succeeds with high probability against an \emph{adaptive adversary}, which can take over processors at any time during the protocol, up to the point of taking over arbitrarily close to a 1/3 fraction. We assume synchronous communication but a \emph{rushing} adversary. Moreover, our algorithm works in the presence of flooding: processors controlled by the adversary can send out any number of messages. We assume the existence of private channels between all pairs of processors but make no other cryptographic assumptions. Finally, our algorithm has latency that is polylogarithmic in $n$. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first algorithm to solve Byzantine agreement against an adaptive adversary, while requiring $o(n^{2})$ total bits of communication.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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