贝叶斯博弈中的状态信息
State Information in Bayesian Games
摘要：
两个玩家的零和重复游戏很好理解。计算这样一个游戏的价值很简单。此外，如果收益取决于一个随机状态的游戏，已知的一个，两个，或没有球员，游戏的结果值已被分析的贝叶斯游戏的框架下。这项调查认为，在游戏中的最佳性能时，一个助手是传输状态信息的球员之一。对抗性设置（游戏）的编码信息需要与率失真理论提供的结果不同的结果。博弈论强调了随机化（混合策略）的重要性，而随机化在大多数通信调制解调器和信源编码编解码器中并不重要。更高的通信速率，以正确的方式使用，允许消息包括在游戏中有用的必要的随机成分。
英文摘要：
Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the resulting value of the game has been analyzed under the framework of Bayesian games. This investigation considers the optimal performance in a game when a helper is transmitting state information to one of the players. Encoding information for an adversarial setting (game) requires a different result than rate-distortion theory provides. Game theory has accentuated the importance of randomization (mixed strategy), which does not find a significant role in most communication modems and source coding codecs. Higher rates of communication, used in the right way, allow the message to include the necessary random component useful in games.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
