arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 0910.0880cs.MAcs.GT
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竞投展示广告的代表名额

Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising

Arpita Ghosh, Preston McAfee, Kishore Papineni, Sergei Vassilvitskii

摘要:

展示广告传统上是通过担保合同销售的-担保合同是出版商和广告客户之间的一项交易,在一定时期内分配一定数量的展示,每次展示的价格预先规定。然而,随着显示广告的现货市场,如RightMedia Exchange,已经变得越来越突出,在给定页面上显示的广告的选择越来越多地基于价格,使用拍卖来选择。随着交易参与者数量的增加,印象的价格成为其价值的信号。价格和价值之间的这种相关性意味着,通过投标执行合同的卖方应该向合同买方提供一系列价格,而不仅仅是满足其需求所需的最便宜的印象。使用一系列价格来实现合同类似于创建广告印象的共同基金,并且需要{ \em随机投标}。我们描述了什么样的分配可以实现随机招标,即那些在每个价格获得的期望份额是一个非增函数的价格。此外,我们提供了一个完整的特性,当一组活动是兼容的,以及如何实现它们与随机投标策略。

英文摘要:

Display advertising has traditionally been sold via guaranteed contracts -- a guaranteed contract is a deal between a publisher and an advertiser to allocate a certain number of impressions over a certain period, for a pre-specified price per impression. However, as spot markets for display ads, such as the RightMedia Exchange, have grown in prominence, the selection of advertisements to show on a given page is increasingly being chosen based on price, using an auction. As the number of participants in the exchange grows, the price of an impressions becomes a signal of its value. This correlation between price and value means that a seller implementing the contract through bidding should offer the contract buyer a range of prices, and not just the cheapest impressions necessary to fulfill its demand. Implementing a contract using a range of prices, is akin to creating a mutual fund of advertising impressions, and requires {\em randomized bidding}. We characterize what allocations can be implemented with randomized bidding, namely those where the desired share obtained at each price is a non-increasing function of price. In addition, we provide a full characterization of when a set of campaigns are compatible and how to implement them with randomized bidding strategies.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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