窃听隐藏网络
Wiretapping a hidden network
摘要：
我们考虑的问题，最大限度地打击一个战略选择的隐藏的虚拟网络，通过放置在一个单一的通信网络的链接窃听的概率。这可以被看作是一个两个玩家的输赢（零和）游戏，我们称之为窃听游戏。这个博弈的价值是窃听者能够确保攻击虚拟网络的最大概率。该值显示为等于基础图形强度的倒数。我们有效地计算一个独特的分区的边缘的图，称为素数分区，并找到一组纯策略的隐藏者是最好的反应，对每一个最大最小策略的窃听器。利用这些特殊的纯策略，我们称之为全连通生成子图，我们定义了素划分的元素的偏序。从偏序出发，我们得到了定义极大极小多胞形的简单二元不等式的线性数，以及它的极值点的特征。我们的偏序的定义，使我们能够找到所有的均衡策略的窃听器，最小化的数量的纯最佳对策的隐藏。在这些策略中，我们有效地计算出唯一的策略，最大化最小的惩罚，隐藏者招致的纯策略，这是不是一个最佳对策。最后，我们表明，这种独特的战略是最近研究的简单合作跨越连接游戏的核心。
英文摘要：
We consider the problem of maximizing the probability of hitting a strategically chosen hidden virtual network by placing a wiretap on a single link of a communication network. This can be seen as a two-player win-lose (zero-sum) game that we call the wiretap game. The value of this game is the greatest probability that the wiretapper can secure for hitting the virtual network. The value is shown to equal the reciprocal of the strength of the underlying graph. We efficiently compute a unique partition of the edges of the graph, called the prime-partition, and find the set of pure strategies of the hider that are best responses against every maxmin strategy of the wiretapper. Using these special pure strategies of the hider, which we call omni-connected-spanning-subgraphs, we define a partial order on the elements of the prime-partition. From the partial order, we obtain a linear number of simple two-variable inequalities that define the maxmin-polytope, and a characterization of its extreme points. Our definition of the partial order allows us to find all equilibrium strategies of the wiretapper that minimize the number of pure best responses of the hider. Among these strategies, we efficiently compute the unique strategy that maximizes the least punishment that the hider incurs for playing a pure strategy that is not a best response. Finally, we show that this unique strategy is the nucleolus of the recently studied simple cooperative spanning connectivity game.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
