利用动态缓存刷新（DCF）算法最小化缓存定时攻击
Minimizing Cache Timing Attack Using Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) Algorithm
摘要：
Rijndael算法于2000年10月被美国国家标准与技术研究所（NIST）的研究小组一致选为高级加密标准（AES）。从那时起，Rijndael注定要在各种软件和硬件实体中大量使用，以加密数据。然而，几年前，Daniel Bernstein设计了一种缓存定时攻击，足以打破封装加密密钥的Rijndael密封。在本文中，我们提出了一个新的动态缓存刷新（DCF）算法，它显示了一套务实的软件措施，将使Rijndael可抵御缓存定时攻击。仿真结果表明，所提出的DCF算法通过在恒定的时间加密密钥提供了更好的安全性。
英文摘要：
Rijndael algorithm was unanimously chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the panel of researchers at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in October 2000. Since then, Rijndael was destined to be used massively in various software as well as hardware entities for encrypting data. However, a few years back, Daniel Bernstein devised a cache timing attack that was capable enough to break Rijndael seal that encapsulates the encryption key. In this paper, we propose a new Dynamic Cache Flushing (DCF) algorithm which shows a set of pragmatic software measures that would make Rijndael impregnable to cache timing attack. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed DCF algorithm provides better security by encrypting key at a constant time.
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