合作、惩罚、政府的出现与当局的悲剧
Cooperation, punishment, emergence of government and the tragedy of authorities
摘要：
在更新世晚期盛行的条件下（小型狩猎采集群体和频繁的群体间冲突），基因相关行为和文化传播的群体水平机构的共同进化为大多数现代人类的狭隘利他主义和互惠特征提供了一个合理的解释。随着农业革命，社会变得更大、更复杂，对违反规范者的监督和惩罚的集体性质不再有效。这导致了新的治理机构和社会等级制度的出现。很可能，人们之所以能够顺利接受新制度，是因为在大多数人中，互惠者特质已经成为一种内化的规范。然而，新的统治阶级有其自身的动力，这反过来又可能导致新的社会危机。使用一个简单的模型，灵感来自Bowles和Gintis以前的工作，这些影响在这里进行了研究。
英文摘要：
Under the conditions prevalent in the late Pleistocene (small hunter-gatherer groups and frequent inter-group conflicts), coevolution of gene-related behavior and culturally transmitted group-level institutions provides a plausible explanation for the parochial altruistic and reciprocator traits of most modern humans. When, with the agricultural revolution, societies became larger and more complex, the collective nature of the monitoring and punishment of norm violators was no longer effective. This led to the emergence of new institutions of governance and social hierarchies. Likely, the smooth acceptance of the new institutions was possible only because, in the majority of the population, the reciprocator trait had become an internalized norm. However the new ruling class has its own dynamics which in turn may lead to new social crisis. Using a simple model, inspired on previous work by Bowles and Gintis, these effects are studied here.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
