自配置网络中的基站选择与基站共享
On the Base Station Selection and Base Station Sharing in Self-Configuring Networks
摘要：
我们模拟了几个无线电设备的交互，旨在通过使用一组基站（BS）作为一个非合作的游戏，以获得无线连接。每个无线电设备的目标是在两种不同的情况下最大化其自身的频谱效率（SE）：首先，我们让每个参与者使用唯一的BS（BS选择），其次，我们让他们同时使用多个BS（BS共享）。在这两种情况下，我们表明，由此产生的游戏是一个确切的潜在的游戏。我们发现BS选择博弈具有多个纳什均衡，而BS分享博弈具有唯一的纳什均衡。我们提供完全分散的算法，总是收敛到NE在这两个游戏。我们分析了BS选择情况下的无政府无政府代价和稳定代价。最后，我们观察到，根据发射机的数量，BS选择技术可能会提供更好的全球性能（网络频谱效率）比BS共享，这表明存在一个Braess型悖论。
英文摘要：
We model the interaction of several radio devices aiming to obtain wireless connectivity by using a set of base stations (BS) as a non-cooperative game. Each radio device aims to maximize its own spectral efficiency (SE) in two different scenarios: First, we let each player to use a unique BS (BS selection) and second, we let them to simultaneously use several BSs (BS Sharing). In both cases, we show that the resulting game is an exact potential game. We found that the BS selection game posses multiple Nash equilibria (NE) while the BS sharing game posses a unique one. We provide fully decentralized algorithms which always converge to a NE in both games. We analyze the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the case of BS selection. Finally, we observed that depending on the number of transmitters, the BS selection technique might provide a better global performance (network spectral efficiency) than BS sharing, which suggests the existence of a Braess type paradox.
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