对标记CAPTCHA的侧信道攻击
Side-channel attack on labeling CAPTCHAs
摘要:
我们提出了一个新的方案,攻击微软的ASIRRA验证码,这是一个重要的捷径,预期的攻击路径,因为它不是基于任何先进的图像识别领域的最新技术。在研究了ASIRRA公共语料库之后,我们得出结论,正如他们的作者所说的那样,安全边际似乎相当乐观。然后,我们分析哪些图像文件的研究参数似乎揭示了最有价值的信息,以帮助正确的分类,达到一个令人惊讶的发现。这代表了一种全新的方法来打破CAPTCHA,可以应用于目前提出的许多图像标记算法,为了证明这一点,我们展示了如何使用相同的方法来对付HumanAuth CAPTCHA。最后,我们研究了一些可以用来保护ASIRRA和HumanAuth方案的措施,但得出的结论是,没有简单的解决方案。
英文摘要:
We propose a new scheme of attack on the Microsoft's ASIRRA CAPTCHA which represents a significant shortcut to the intended attacking path, as it is not based in any advance in the state of the art on the field of image recognition. After studying the ASIRRA Public Corpus, we conclude that the security margin as stated by their authors seems to be quite optimistic. Then, we analyze which of the studied parameters for the image files seems to disclose the most valuable information for helping in correct classification, arriving at a surprising discovery. This represents a completely new approach to breaking CAPTCHAs that can be applied to many of the currently proposed image-labeling algorithms, and to prove this point we show how to use the very same approach against the HumanAuth CAPTCHA. Lastly, we investigate some measures that could be used to secure the ASIRRA and HumanAuth schemes, but conclude no easy solutions are at hand.
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