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arXiv 0907.3402cs.CR
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密码强度度量的实证分析

Measuring Password Strength: An Empirical Analysis

Matteo Dell'Amico, Pietro Michiardi, Yves Roudier

摘要:

我们对意大利一个即时通讯服务器用户的近10,000个密码的强度进行了深入分析。我们估计这些密码的强度,并比较最先进的攻击方法,如字典和基于马尔可夫链的技术的有效性。我们表明,用户选择的密码的强度变化很大,并且当攻击者想要获得更高的成功率时,基于密码强度的攻击成本增长非常快。根据现有的研究,我们观察到,在没有强制执行密码强度的措施,弱密码是常见的。另一方面,我们发现总会有一部分用户拥有极强的密码,这些密码不太可能被破解。我们的研究结果将有助于评估基于密码的身份验证手段的安全性,并为启发新的更好的主动密码检查器和密码恢复工具提供重要的见解。

英文摘要:

We present an in-depth analysis on the strength of the almost 10,000 passwords from users of an instant messaging server in Italy. We estimate the strength of those passwords, and compare the effectiveness of state-of-the-art attack methods such as dictionaries and Markov chain-based techniques. We show that the strength of passwords chosen by users varies enormously, and that the cost of attacks based on password strength grows very quickly when the attacker wants to obtain a higher success percentage. In accordance with existing studies we observe that, in the absence of measures for enforcing password strength, weak passwords are common. On the other hand we discover that there will always be a subset of users with extremely strong passwords that are very unlikely to be broken. The results of our study will help in evaluating the security of password-based authentication means, and they provide important insights for inspiring new and better proactive password checkers and password recovery tools.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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