arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
北美退伍军人节(Veterans Day),12 日无更新
arXiv 0906.4431cs.CC
收藏

Probably Lobbying的复杂性

The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying

Daniel Binkele-Raible, Gábor Erdélyi, Henning Fernau, Judy Goldsmith, Nicholas Mattei, Jörg Rothe

摘要:

我们提出了一个概率环境中的游说模型,其中一个演员(称为“游说”)试图影响选民的偏好投票赞成或反对多个问题时,选民的偏好表示的概率。特别是,我们提供了两个评估标准和两个贿赂的方法来正式描述这些模型,我们认为所产生的形式游说和没有问题的权重。我们提供了一个正式的分析,这些问题的游说在随机环境中,并确定其经典和参数化的复杂性取决于给定的贿赂/评估标准和各种自然参数化。具体地说,我们证明了这些问题中的一些可以在多项式时间内解决,一些是NP完全的,但固定参数易处理的,和一些是W[2]-完全的。最后,我们提供这些问题和几个变种的近似性和不可近似性的结果。

英文摘要:

We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of probabilities. In particular, we provide two evaluation criteria and two bribery methods to formally describe these models, and we consider the resulting forms of lobbying with and without issue weighting. We provide a formal analysis for these problems of lobbying in a stochastic environment, and determine their classical and parameterized complexity depending on the given bribery/evaluation criteria and on various natural parameterizations. Specifically, we show that some of these problems can be solved in polynomial time, some are NP-complete but fixed-parameter tractable, and some are W[2]-complete. Finally, we provide approximability and inapproximability results for these problems and several variants.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑