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arXiv 0905.2366q-fin.TR
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短期电力市场模型中价格分歧的出现

Emergence of Price Divergence in a Model Short-Term Electric Power Market

Randall A. LaViolette, Lory A. Ellebracht, Kevin L. Stamber, Charles J. Gieseler, Benjamin K. Cook

摘要:

一个最小的模型,市场的短视的非合作代理人的双边交易随机出价再现定性特征的短期电力市场,如在加利福尼亚州和新英格兰。每个代理都知道自己的预算和偏好,但不知道其他代理的预算和偏好。在交易时段中途建立的接近平衡的价格在交易时段结束时会分化为高得多的价格和低得多的价格。这种价格差异出现在模型中,没有任何可能性,代理人可以合谋“游戏”的市场。结果弱敏感的禀赋,但强烈敏感的代理人的偏好和预算约束的性质。

英文摘要:

A minimal model of a market of myopic non-cooperative agents who trade bilaterally with random bids reproduces qualitative features of short-term electric power markets, such as those in California and New England. Each agent knows its own budget and preferences but not those of any other agent. The near-equilibrium price established mid-way through the trading session diverges to both much higher and much lower prices towards the end of the trading session. This price divergence emerges in the model without any possibility that the agents could have conspired to "game" the market. The results were weakly sensitive to the endowments but strongly sensitive to the nature of the agent's preferences and budget constraints.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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