基于Mastermind的字符串学习--以mtDNA为例
Learning Character Strings via Mastermind Queries, with a Case Study Involving mtDNA
摘要：
我们研究的程度，一个字符串，$Q$，泄漏有关自己的细节，任何时候，它从事比较协议与字符串提供的查询器，鲍勃，即使这些协议是加密保证不产生额外的信息，除了分数，评估的程度，$Q$匹配字符串提供的鲍勃。我们表明，这样的情况下，让鲍勃玩游戏的主谋与$Q$的变种，以了解完整的身份$Q$。我们发现，有一些有效的实施鲍勃采用这些主谋攻击，根据知识，他对结构的$Q$，这表明如何快速，他可以确定$Q$。事实上，我们表明，鲍勃可以发现$Q$使用的测试比较的数量比$Q$的长度小得多，在合理的假设下，关于类型的分数是由加密协议返回的，他是否可以使用知识的分布，$Q$来自。我们还提供了我们对线粒体DNA数据库进行的案例研究的结果，显示了现有真实世界DNA数据对Mastermind攻击的脆弱性。
英文摘要：
We study the degree to which a character string, $Q$, leaks details about itself any time it engages in comparison protocols with a strings provided by a querier, Bob, even if those protocols are cryptographically guaranteed to produce no additional information other than the scores that assess the degree to which $Q$ matches strings offered by Bob. We show that such scenarios allow Bob to play variants of the game of Mastermind with $Q$ so as to learn the complete identity of $Q$. We show that there are a number of efficient implementations for Bob to employ in these Mastermind attacks, depending on knowledge he has about the structure of $Q$, which show how quickly he can determine $Q$. Indeed, we show that Bob can discover $Q$ using a number of rounds of test comparisons that is much smaller than the length of $Q$, under reasonable assumptions regarding the types of scores that are returned by the cryptographic protocols and whether he can use knowledge about the distribution that $Q$ comes from. We also provide the results of a case study we performed on a database of mitochondrial DNA, showing the vulnerability of existing real-world DNA data to the Mastermind attack.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
