二元概率叛逆者追踪码的最坏情况攻击
Worst case attacks against binary probabilistic traitor tracing codes
摘要：
对叛逆者追踪代码的设计有深刻见解的观点必须考虑共谋者可能导致的最坏情况的攻击。本文从信息论的角度出发，将最坏情况下的攻击定义为使叛逆者追踪码的可达速率最小化的合谋策略。设想了两种不同的解码器，如最近由P. Moulin \cite{Moulin08universal}定义的联合解码器和简单解码器。几类共谋者被定义为越来越多的权力。最坏情况下的攻击时，适用于Tardos的代码和概率版本的Boneh-Shaw建设每个类和每个解码器。本文给出了二进制概率叛逆者追踪码所能达到的实际速率。通常在文献中考虑的攻击，如多数票或少数票，实际上在很大程度上是次优的。本文还说明了分时概念在概率码中的重要性。
英文摘要：
An insightful view into the design of traitor tracing codes should necessarily consider the worst case attacks that the colluders can lead. This paper takes an information-theoretic point of view where the worst case attack is defined as the collusion strategy minimizing the achievable rate of the traitor tracing code. Two different decoders are envisaged, the joint decoder and the simple decoder, as recently defined by P. Moulin \cite{Moulin08universal}. Several classes of colluders are defined with increasing power. The worst case attack is derived for each class and each decoder when applied to Tardos' codes and a probabilistic version of the Boneh-Shaw construction. This contextual study gives the real rates achievable by the binary probabilistic traitor tracing codes. Attacks usually considered in literature, such as majority or minority votes, are indeed largely suboptimal. This article also shows the utmost importance of the time-sharing concept in a probabilistic codes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
