操纵代币系统：Sybils和共谋
Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion
摘要：
分布式和对等系统的博弈论分析通常使用纳什均衡解决方案的概念，但这明确排除了涉及多个代理的战略行为的可能性。我们研究的影响，两种类型的战略行为，涉及一个以上的代理商，sybils和共谋，在代理商相互提供服务，以换取代币的代币系统的背景下。Sybils使代理人更有可能被选中提供服务，这通常使没有sybils的代理人更难赚钱，并降低了社会福利。令人惊讶的是，在某些情况下，sybils有可能使所有代理人都变得更好。虽然共谋通常是不好的，但在代币系统的背景下，它实际上倾向于使所有代理人都变得更好，而不仅仅是那些共谋者。这些结果也提供了洞察允许代理人做广告和贷款的影响。虽然许多扩展的纳什均衡已被提出，解决共谋和其他相关的分布式和对等系统的问题，我们的研究结果表明，他们都没有充分解决的问题所提出的sybils和共谋在代币系统。
英文摘要：
Game-theoretic analyses of distributed and peer-to-peer systems typically use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, but this explicitly excludes the possibility of strategic behavior involving more than one agent. We examine the effects of two types of strategic behavior involving more than one agent, sybils and collusion, in the context of scrip systems where agents provide each other with service in exchange for scrip. Sybils make an agent more likely to be chosen to provide service, which generally makes it harder for agents without sybils to earn money and decreases social welfare. Surprisingly, in certain circumstances it is possible for sybils to make all agents better off. While collusion is generally bad, in the context of scrip systems it actually tends to make all agents better off, not merely those who collude. These results also provide insight into the effects of allowing agents to advertise and loan money. While many extensions of Nash equilibrium have been proposed that address collusion and other issues relevant to distributed and peer-to-peer systems, our results show that none of them adequately address the issues raised by sybils and collusion in scrip systems.
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