策略性三选投票的动态性
Dynamics of Strategic Three-Choice Voting
摘要：
在某些议会民主国家，每隔几次选举就会有两个主要政党上台和下台，而第三个少数党基本上从未执政。我们提出了一个简单的模型来解释这种现象，少数党的支持者有时会在意识形态上投票（支持他们的政党），有时会在战略上投票（反对他们最不喜欢的政党）。这些截然不同的倾向之间的竞争再现了经验观察，即两个政党经常交换多数地位，而第三方几乎总是处于少数地位。
英文摘要：
In certain parliamentary democracies, there are two major parties that move in and out of power every few elections, and a third minority party that essentially never governs. We present a simple model to account for this phenomenon, in which minority party supporters sometimes vote ideologically (for their party) and sometimes strategically (against the party they like the least). The competition between these disparate tendencies reproduces the empirical observation of two parties that frequently exchange majority status and a third party that is almost always in the minority.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
