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arXiv 0811.3245math.COmath.HO
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在和谐的社会中投票

Voting in agreeable societies

Deborah E. Berg, Serguei Norine, Francis Edward Su, Robin Thomas, Paul Wollan

摘要:

大多数选民什么时候才能找到共同点,也就是说,他们都同意的立场?政治光谱的形状如何影响结果?当数学对象具有社会解释时,相关的定理具有社会应用。在这篇文章中,我们给出的情况下,集模型的偏好和发展的经典定理的凸集,如Helly的定理,可用于分析投票中的“合意”的社会扩展的例子。

英文摘要:

When can a majority of voters find common ground, that is, a position they all agree upon? How does the shape of the political spectrum influence the outcome? When mathematical objects have a social interpretation, the associated theorems have social applications. In this article we give examples of situations where sets model preferences and develop extensions of classical theorems about convex sets, such as Helly's theorem, that can be used in the analysis of voting in "agreeable" societies.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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