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arXiv 0811.0253physics.soc-ph
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TI博弈I:战略决策中类型不确定性的探索

TI-games I: An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy In Strategic Decision-Making

Jerome Busemeyer, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky

摘要:

类型不确定性模型是一个理论框架,它形式化了Kahneman和Tversky提出的建构性偏好观点。在本文中,我们探讨了TI模型从简单到战略决策的扩展。研究了一个2X2游戏。我们首先表明,在一个一次性的错误移动设置的TI模型是等价于一个标准的不完全信息模型。然后,我们让这个博弈在一个廉价的承诺交换博弈之前进行。我们在一个例子中表明,在TI模型的承诺阶段可以影响下一个以下的行为时,标准的经典模型预测没有任何影响。TI方法不同于其他行为方法,它将廉价谈话承诺的效果来源于参与者类型的内在不确定性。

英文摘要:

The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that formalizes the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we explore an extention of the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making. A 2X2 game is investigated. We first show that in a one-shot simultaneaous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to a standard incomplete information model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise exchange game. We show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have impact on next following behavior when the standard classical model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the players' type.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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