决策，决策，决策：萨维奇能挽救埃弗雷特概率吗？
Decisions, Decisions, Decisions: Can Savage Salvage Everettian Probability?
摘要：
批评者反对说，埃弗雷特的观点不能理解量子概率，在两个方面中的一个或两个方面：要么它根本不能理解概率，要么它不能解释为什么概率应该由玻恩规则支配。大卫·多伊奇（David Deutsch）试图通过诉诸萨维奇理性决策理论的埃弗雷特版本来回应这些反对意见。多伊奇不仅认为，在埃弗雷特世界中，不确定性下的经典决策的类似物是有意义的;而且在合理的假设下，理性埃弗雷特代理人的下注几率应该受到波恩规则的约束。多伊奇的提议得到了大卫·华莱士的辩护和发展，并以不同的形式得到了希拉里·格里夫斯的辩护和发展。在本文中，我提供了一些反对德意志-华莱士-格里夫斯的论点，特别是集中在假设的类比与经典的决定下的不确定性。
英文摘要：
Critics object that the Everett view cannot make sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it cannot make sense of probability at all, or it cannot explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections by appealing to an Everettian version of Savage's rational decision theory. Deutsch argues not only that an analogue of classical decision under uncertainty makes sense in an Everett world; but also that under reasonable assumptions, the betting odds of a rational Everettian agent should be constrained by the Born rule. Deutsch's proposal has been defended and developed by David Wallace, and in a different form by Hilary Greaves. In this paper I offer some objections to the Deutsch-Wallace-Greaves argument, focussing in particular on the supposed analogy with classical decision under uncertainty.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
