雪堆博弈中随机漂移对混合策略和纯策略的影响
The Effect of a Random Drift on Mixed and Pure Strategies in the Snowdrift Game
摘要：
参与者选择混合策略或纯策略的复制因子动态通常被认为是等效的，只要策略的使用频率相同。在本文中，我们表明，人口的纯战略家可以入侵的混合战略家在任何两个玩家的游戏均衡共存后，在复制过程中添加任意少量的噪音。
英文摘要：
The replicator dynamics of players choosing either mixed or pure strategies are usually regarded as equivalent, as long as strategies are played with identical frequencies. In this paper we show that a population of pure strategists can be invaded by mixed strategists in any two-player game with equilibrium coexistence upon the addition of an arbitrarily small amount of noise in the replication process.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
