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arXiv 0711.2334math.OC
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凸合作对策中的激励大联盟

Encouraging the grand coalition in convex cooperative games

Titu Andreescu, Zoran Sunic

摘要:

凸可转移效用博弈的解函数鼓励大联盟,如果没有玩家喜欢(在文本中定义的精确意义上)任何联盟。我们发现Shapley值在所有的凸对策中鼓励大联盟,τ值在最多三个(但不超过三个)玩家的凸对策中鼓励大联盟。在凸对策中,鼓励大联盟的解函数总是在核心中产生分配,但反之则不一定正确。

英文摘要:

A solution function for convex transferable utility games encourages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value encourages the grand coalition in all convex games and the tau-value encourages the grand coalitions in convex games up to three (but not more than three) players. Solution functions that encourage the grand coalition in convex games always produce allocations in the core, but the converse is not necessarily true.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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