关于通过操纵通信规则来强制和阻止共识的权力
About the Power to Enforce and Prevent Consensus by Manipulating Communication Rules
摘要：
我们探讨的可能性，强制执行和防止共识，在连续的观点动力学，导致修改的通信规则。我们指的是Weisbuch和Deffuant的模型，其中$n$代理调整他们的连续意见作为随机成对遭遇的结果，每当他们的意见不超过一个给定的置信区间$\eps$。高$\eps$导致共识，而低$\eps$导致分裂成几个意见集群。我们放弃随机相遇的假设，问：$\eps$可能有多小，以至于整个群体仍然有可能通过某种沟通计划达成共识？数学分析表明，$\eps$可能显著小于随机成对情况。另一方面，我们要问：$\eps$有多大，才有可能阻止共识？在回答这个问题时，我们证明了Reichato的模拟结果，即对于大群体的$\eps>0.5$，共识不能被阻止。%接下来，我们考虑不同的个人策略下的观点动力学，并检查它们的力量，以增加共识的机会。结果之一是，平衡代理人增加了达成共识的机会，特别是如果代理人在调整他们的意见时非常谨慎。然而，好奇的代理人只有在这些代理人不谨慎地调整他们的意见时才能增加达成共识的机会。
英文摘要：
We explore the possibilities of enforcing and preventing consensus in continuous opinion dynamics that result from modifications in the communication rules. We refer to the model of Weisbuch and Deffuant, where $n$ agents adjust their continuous opinions as a result of random pairwise encounters whenever their opinions differ not more than a given bound of confidence $\eps$. A high $\eps$ leads to consensus, while a lower $\eps$ leads to a fragmentation into several opinion clusters. We drop the random encounter assumption and ask: How small may $\eps$ be such that consensus is still possible with a certain communication plan for the entire group? Mathematical analysis shows that $\eps$ may be significantly smaller than in the random pairwise case. On the other hand we ask: How large may $\eps$ be such that preventing consensus is still possible? In answering this question we prove Fortunato's simulation result that consensus cannot be prevented for $\eps>0.5$ for large groups. % Next we consider opinion dynamics under different individual strategies and examine their power to increase the chances of consensus. One result is that balancing agents increase chances of consensus, especially if the agents are cautious in adapting their opinions. However, curious agents increase chances of consensus only if those agents are not cautious in adapting their opinions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
