适应性种群中支付函数和偏好分布的影响
Effects of payoff functions and preference distributions in an adaptive population
摘要:
适应性群体,如那些在金融市场和分布式控制可以建模的少数人游戏。我们考虑他们的动态依赖于代理的初始偏好的策略,当代理使用线性或二次支付函数来评估他们的策略。我们发现,种群做出某些决策的波动性(波动性)取决于策略初始偏好分布的多样性。当多样性减少时,更多的代理人倾向于一起调整他们的策略。在具有线性回报的系统中,这会导致波动性从消失到非消失的动态转变。对于低信号维度,不同信号的动态转换不会发生在相同的临界分集。相反,当多样性减少时,会发生一连串的动态转变。相比之下,没有相变被发现在系统的二次支付。相反,吸引力的盆边界将代理决策空间中的两组样本分开。在这个边界内的初始状态收敛到小波动,而在边界外的初始状态则发散到大波动。此外,当偏好分布变得更加两极化时,动态变得更加不稳定。所有上述结果都得到了很好的模拟和理论之间的协议支持。
英文摘要:
Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or quadratic payoff functions to evaluate their strategies. We find that the fluctuations of the population making certain decisions (the volatility) depends on the diversity of the distribution of the initial preferences of strategies. When the diversity decreases, more agents tend to adapt their strategies together. In systems with linear payoffs, this results in dynamical transitions from vanishing volatility to a non-vanishing one. For low signal dimensions, the dynamical transitions for the different signals do not take place at the same critical diversity. Rather, a cascade of dynamical transitions takes place when the diversity is reduced. In contrast, no phase transitions are found in systems with the quadratic payoffs. Instead, a basin boundary of attraction separates two groups of samples in the space of the agents' decisions. Initial states inside this boundary converge to small volatility, while those outside diverge to a large one. Furthermore, when the preference distribution becomes more polarized, the dynamics becomes more erratic. All the above results are supported by good agreement between simulations and theory.
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