概率论与可接受的证据
Probabilistic Anonymity and Admissible Schedulers
摘要:
在研究(正式的)协议模型的安全属性时,通常将调度器视为对手:试图伪造安全属性的实体。我们表明,在安全协议的背景下,特别是匿名协议,这给对手太多的权力,例如,加密消息的内容和内部计算的各方应被视为无形的对手。我们限制类的可接受的更好的模型对抗的行为。这些可接受的决策者仅仅基于对手可见的系统过去的行为。利用这一点,我们提出了一个定义的匿名性:对于所有可接受的攻击者的身份的用户和对手的观察是独立的随机变量。我们还开发了一个典型的情况下,可以用来证明匿名性的证明技术:一个系统是匿名的,如果它是可能的“交换”的两个用户的行为没有对手的“欺骗”。
英文摘要:
When studying safety properties of (formal) protocol models, it is customary to view the scheduler as an adversary: an entity trying to falsify the safety property. We show that in the context of security protocols, and in particular of anonymizing protocols, this gives the adversary too much power; for instance, the contents of encrypted messages and internal computations by the parties should be considered invisible to the adversary. We restrict the class of schedulers to a class of admissible schedulers which better model adversarial behaviour. These admissible schedulers base their decision solely on the past behaviour of the system that is visible to the adversary. Using this, we propose a definition of anonymity: for all admissible schedulers the identity of the users and the observations of the adversary are independent stochastic variables. We also develop a proof technique for typical cases that can be used to proof anonymity: a system is anonymous if it is possible to `exchange' the behaviour of two users without the adversary `noticing'.
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