量子拍卖
Quantum Auctions
摘要：
我们提出了一个量子拍卖协议，使用叠加来表示出价和分布式搜索来识别赢家。测量最终的量子态给出拍卖结果，同时破坏叠加态。因此，未中标的投标永远不会公布。参与者可以使用纠缠来安排他们的出价之间的相关性，并确保这种纠缠不会被其他人观察到。该协议是有用的信息隐藏的应用程序，如合作伙伴招标与分配外部性或关注揭示投标偏好。该协议适用于各种拍卖类型，例如，第一或第二价格;以及涉及单个项目或任意项目束的拍卖（即，组合拍卖）。我们分析了一个密封的投标量子的简单情况下的量子协议的博弈论行为，并显示如何适当设计的绝热搜索减少投标人的可能性，以游戏拍卖。这个设计说明了激励而不是计算约束如何影响量子算法的选择。
英文摘要：
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition. Thus non-winning bids are never revealed. Participants can use entanglement to arrange for correlations among their bids, with the assurance that this entanglement is not observable by others. The protocol is useful for information hiding applications, such as partnership bidding with allocative externality or concerns about revealing bidding preferences. The protocol applies to a variety of auction types, e.g., first or second price, and to auctions involving either a single item or arbitrary bundles of items (i.e., combinatorial auctions). We analyze the game-theoretical behavior of the quantum protocol for the simple case of a sealed-bid quantum, and show how a suitably designed adiabatic search reduces the possibilities for bidders to game the auction. This design illustrates how incentive rather that computational constraints affect quantum algorithm choices.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
